Abstract-Perfect data privacy seems to be in fundamental opposition to the economical and scientific opportunities related to extensive data exchange. This paper defies this intuition by developing the principle of synergistic disclosure, in which collective properties of datasets are revealed without compromising the privacy of individual data samples. We study the properties of optimal strategies/mappings on finite as well as asymptotically large datasets, and discuss its fundamental limits defined as the synergistic disclosure capacity. Furthermore, we present explicit analytical expressions for the synergistic disclosure capacity of large datasets in various scenarios, and present cases in which our approach can disclose most of the information of interest. We finally discuss suboptimal schemes to provide sample privacy guarantees to large datasets at a reduced computational cost.
the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) adopted by the European Union at an estimated cost of e200 billion [2] , and the recent adoption of differential privacy [3] standards by major tech companies including Apple and Google.
A key open problem is how to satisfy sufficient privacy requirements while still enabling the benefits of extensive data sharing. The dominant approach to address this problem has been to develop privacy-preserving data disclosure techniques, which are based on the intuition that the content of a dataset can be divided into two qualitatively different parts: nonsensitive statistical regularities that exist across the data, and private information that refers to the contents of specific entries/users. This distinction suggests that one could extract and share global properties of data, while keeping information about specific samples confidential.
The highest privacy standard, called perfect privacy, is achieved when the private contents remain confidential after disclosure. While studied in [4] , [5] , perfect privacy is often disregarded for being too restrictive, corresponding to an extreme choice within the trade-off that exists between privacy and utility [6] , [7] . The most popular approach that takes advantage of this trade-off is differential privacy [8] , which is equipped with free parameters that can be flexibly tuned in order to adapt to the requirements of diverse scenarios. However, while these degrees of freedom provide significant flexibility, determining the range of values that can guarantee that the system is "secure enough" is usually not straightforward [9] .
There is an urgent need of procedures to enable effective data exchange while ensuring rigorous privacy guarantees. The goal of this work is to revisit perfect privacy and present algorithms to build perfectly-private data disclosure procedures.
A. Scenario and Related Work
Let us consider a user who has a private dataset, denoted by X n (X 1 , . . . , X n ), which is correlated with a latent variable of interest, denoted by W , that the user would like to share with an analyst. Importantly, the user has no direct access to W , but can only attempt to infer its contents via the information provided by X n . For instance, X n can be measurements of a patient's vital signals while W is a particular health indicator, e.g., the risk of heart attack. Although it would be desirable for the patient to share the whole dataset with a remote assessment unit to provide early alerts in case of an emergency, this could also reveal unintended personal information.
We follow the framework for privacy against inference attacks [10] , [11] , which proposes to disclose a variable Y that is obtained through a mapping from the dataset. This work focuses on mappings that satisfy perfect sample privacy; that is, mappings whose output (Y ) do not provide information that could foster statistical inference on the value of any particular sample, i.e., on X i for all i = 1, . . . , n. Mathematically, this is equivalent to mappings whereby Y and X i are statistically independent for all i = 1, . . . , n, while W − X n − Y form a Markov chain. To assess the quality of Y as an estimator of W , we consider the mutual information between the two, I (Y ; W ) as the utility measure. Mutual information quantifies the average distortion between W and Y under the log-loss distortion measure [12] , and is an adequate proxy (with better algebraic properties) for the estimation error rate, also known as 0-1 loss [13] , [14] , which is a central performance metric for classification and many other machine learning tasks [15] . Mutual information as a utility measure in the privacy-utility trade-off context has been considered in other recent works, such as [5] , [16] [17] [18] . Interestingly, the above conditions are not equivalent to imposing statistical independence between the disclosed variable Y and the whole dataset X n . This is due to a counterintuitive and largely underexploited feature of multivariate statistics: variables that are pairwise independent can still be globally interdependent [19] , [20] . Said differently, while I (Y ; X n ) = 0 implies I (Y ; X i ) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n, the converse does not hold. For example, if X 1 and X 2 are two independent fair coins, then Y = X 1 ⊕ X 2 (i.e., their exclusive OR) is independent of each of them, while I (X 1 , X 2 ; Y ) > 0 [21] . In this case, Y reveals a collective property (whether X 1 and X 2 are equal or not), while saying nothing about the specific values of X 1 or X 2 . Similarly, our approach is to disclose collective properties of datasets that do not compromise individual data samples.
Differential privacy is driven by similar desiderata, but the corresponding set of techniques and guarantees are quite different [3] . A disclosure mapping Y is said to be -differentially private if log Pr{Y |X n = x n } ≤ +log Pr{Y |X n =x n } for any pair of datasets x n andx n that differ in only one entry, so that the value of a particular sample is not supposed to affect too much the value of Y and vice-versa. Hence, while perfect sample privacy guarantees strict independence between the disclosed data and each sample, differential privacy only limits their conditional dependency 1 . However, it has been shown that this latter restriction fails to provide privacy guarantees, as some -differentially private disclosure mechanisms can still allow the leakage of an unbounded amount of information --independently of how small might be [11, Theorem 4] .
A related problem is the privacy funnel, in which the goal is to reveal the dataset X n within a given accuracy while keeping the latent variable W as private as possible [16] , where mutual information is used both as the privacy and the utility measure. Various other measures have been studied for a privacy funnel to quantify the quality of the disclosure strategy in [5] , [7] , [17] , [22] . 1 A direct calculation shows that differential privacy imposes a restriction on the conditional mutual information, i.e. I (Y ; X i |X n −i ) ≤ for all i = 1, . . . , n, where X n −i stands for the whole dataset excluding X i .
B. Contributions
In this paper we study a data disclosure technique that guarantees perfect sample privacy, which we call "synergistic information disclosure" as it reveals information about the whole dataset (i.e., about X n ), but not about any of its constituting elements (i.e., X i 's). Our scheme requires knowledge of the statistics of the dataset and the latent feature, which explains why it can provide both privacy and utility without violating the no-free lunch results related to data privacy [23] . Building upon [24] , we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that determine when information about a latent feature can be synergistically disclosed, and present a simple but tight upper bound on the maximum amount of information that can be disclosed. Moreover, we provide a practical procedure for building an optimal synergistic disclosure mapping, which is based on linear programming (LP) methods, as stated in Theorem 1. We illustrate this method on a simple scenario where the dataset X consists of two binary samples, for which we provide a closed-form expression for the performance of the optimal synergistic disclosure mapping.
When considering large datasets, we obtain the asymptotic performance limit of optimal synergistic disclosure when the dataset is composed of noisy measurements of a phenomenon of interest in Theorems 2 and 3. As a by-product of this analysis, we observe a link between the full data observation and output perturbation models in [7] . Moreover, when considering self-disclosure, we show that in most cases the ratio of the information that one can synergistically disclose about the dataset to the information content of the dataset tends asymptotically to one, provided in Theorem 4. We also show, in Theorem 5, that the synergistic disclosure capacity diverges when applied to datasets of continuous samples. Finally, we present two suboptimal schemes of low computational complexity that still guarantee perfect sample privacy, which are well suited to large datasets composed of independent samples.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II introduces the notion of perfect sample privacy, and develops the conditions and bounds that characterize the private disclosure capacity. Subsequently, Section III proves that the optimal mapping can be found through an LP, and illustrate these findings by deriving the optimal mapping for a simple scenario. Then, Section IV studies the asymptotic performance for datasets of noisy observations of a latent feature. Section V considers the limits of synergistic self-disclosure, while Section V-B studies the case of datasets with continuous variables. Finally, Section VI conveys our conclusions and final remarks.
C. Notation
Random variables (r.v.'s) are denoted by capital letters and their realizations by lowercase letters. For two r.v.'s X and Y , X ⊥ ⊥ Y indicates that they are statistically independent. Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold capital and bold lowercase letters, respectively. For a matrix A m×k , the null space, rank, and nullity are denoted by Null(A), rank(A), and nul(A), respectively, with rank(A) + nul(A) = k.
For integers m and n, m ≤ n, we define the discrete interval [m : n] {m, m + 1, . . . , n}, and for [1 : n], we use the shorthand notation [n] . For an integer n ≥ 1, 1 n denotes an n-dimensional all-one column vector. For a finite alphabet X , the probability simplex P(X ) is the standard (|X |−1)-simplex given by
To each probability mass function (pmf) on X , denoted by p X (·) (or written simply as p X ), corresponds a probability vector p X ∈ P(X ), whose i -th element is p X (x i ) (i ∈ [|X |]). Likewise, for a pair of discrete r.v.'s (X, Y ) with joint pmf p X,Y , the probability vector p X |y corresponds to the conditional pmf p X |Y (·|y), ∀y ∈ Y, and P X |Y is an |X | × |Y| matrix with columns p X |y , ∀y ∈ Y.
II. DEFINITIONS AND BASIC PROPERTIES

A. Perfect Sample Privacy and Synergistic Disclosure
Consider a case where a user has access to a dataset, denoted by X n , which is dependent on a latent variable of interest W that the user wishes to share with an analyst. The constituting elements of the dataset, i.e., X i 's (which are in general random variables), are informally referred to as "data samples". The variables W, X n are assumed to be distributed according to a given joint distribution p W,X n .
Our goal is to process the dataset X n in a way that the result is maximally informative about W , while keeping the content of each X i ∀i ∈ [n] confidential. Without loss of generality, we consider data disclosure strategies that take the form of a stochastic mapping, which can be captured by a conditional pmf p Y |X n . By this construction, W − X n − Y form a Markov chain. Throughout the paper, unless stated otherwise, we focus on the case where |W|, |X i | < ∞, ∀i ∈ [n].
Our first step is to provide a suitable definition of data privacy. Although the condition Y ⊥ ⊥ X n is sufficient for guaranteeing perfect privacy of the data samples, it is too constrictive. In fact, from the data processing inequality, if Y ⊥ ⊥ X n then Y ⊥ ⊥ W , implying that such a requirement makes Y useless for the task of informing about W . In the following, we introduce the notion of perfect sample privacy, which imposes a set of more flexible constraints. 
Therefore, a variable Y generated by processing X n via a mapping p Y |X n ∈ A cannot foster statistical inference attacks over any of the samples of the dataset. Interestingly, mappings that satisfy perfect sample privacy can still carry useful information about latent variables. Our key principle is synergistic disclosure: that is possible for Y to carry information about a latent feature W while revealing no information about any of the individual data samples. The next definition formalizes this notion by characterizing the latent variables that are feasible of being synergistically disclosed. 
Finally, the synergistic disclosure efficiency is defined as
The term "synergistic" comes from the fact that a synergistic disclosure mapping reveals collective properties of the whole dataset that do not compromise its "parts" (i.e. the samples themselves). In the sequel, I s is employed as a shorthand notation for I s (W, X n ) when the dataset and latent feature are clear.
Let the support of X n be defined aŝ
From this definition, p X n always lies in the interior of P(X ).
where G n i=1 |X i |. Note that P is a binary matrix, as X i 's are deterministic functions of X n . For example, if |X i | = 2, ∀i ∈ [n] andX is the set of all binary n-sequences, i.e.,X = {0, 1} n , then P is a 2n × 2 n matrix that can be built recursively according to
with P = P n and P 1 = 10 01 . (3) .
The importance of P is clarified in the following lemma, whose proof is presented in [24] .
B. Fundamental Properties of Synergistic Disclosure
The following proposition characterizes the class of features that are feasible of synergistic disclosure from a given dataset, whose proof can be found in [24] .
Proposition 1: For a given pair (W, X n ), W is feasible of synergistic disclosure if and only if
Proposition 1 can be understood intuitively as follows. Changing p X n along the vectors in Null(P) corresponds to conditional pmfs p X n |Y whose corresponding p Y |X n guarantee perfect sample privacy, while changing p X n along the vectors in Null(P W |X n ) corresponds to the conditional pmfs p X n |Y that result in W ⊥ ⊥ Y . Therefore, the condition Null(P) ⊂ Null(P W |X n ) asks for the existence of conditional probabilities that guarantee perfect sample privacy while introducing statistical dependencies with W .
Proposition 2: The following upper bound holds for I s :
where X n − j {X 1 , . . . , X n }\X j . Proof: Please see [24] . 
Remark 4: From Proposition 2 and noting that
I (W ; X n − j |X j ) = I (W ; X n ) − I (W ; X j ), we obtain I (W ; X n ) − I s ≥ max j ∈[n] I (W ; X j ),(5)
III. THE OPTIMAL SYNERGISTIC DISCLOSURE MAPPING
This section presents a practical method for computing the optimal latent feature disclosure strategy/mapping under perfect sample privacy. In what follows, we assume that nul(P) = 0, since otherwise we have from Proposition 1 that I s = 0, making the result trivial.
A. General Solution
Before stating the main result of this section in Theorem 1, some essential preliminaries are needed as follows. Consider the singular value decomposition (SVD) of P, which gives P = UV T with the matrix of right eigenvectors being
By assuming (without loss of generality) that the singular values are arranged in a descending order, only the first rank(P) singular values are non-zero. Therefore, it is direct to check that the null space of P is given by
T which, due to the orthogonality of the columns of V, has the useful property Null(
Let S be defined as
which is a convex polytope in P(X ), since it can be written as the intersection of a finite number of half-spaces in P(X ).
In the Markov chain W − X n − Y with p Y |X n ∈ A, one can see from (8) that p X n |y ∈ S, ∀y ∈ Y. On the other hand, for any p X n ,Y for which p X n |y ∈ S, ∀y ∈ Y, it is guaranteed that if one uses the corresponding mapping p Y |X n to build a Markov chain W −X n −Y , then the condition X i ⊥ ⊥ Y, ∀i ∈ [n] holds. The above arguments prove the following equivalence:
Proposition 3: The supremum in (2) is attained, and hence, it is a maximum. Furthermore, it is sufficient to have |Y| ≤ nul(P) + 1.
Proof: Please refer to the extended online version [26] for the proof.
Later, in Corollary 1.1, it is shown that it is necessary to have |Y| ≥ |X | rank(P) . 
where, since the minimization is over p X n |y rather than p Y |X n , the constraint y p Y (y)p X n |y = p X n has been added to preserve the distribution p X n specified in p W,X n . Lemma 2: When minimizing H (W |Y ) over p X n |y ∈ S in (12) , it is sufficient to consider only the extreme points of S.
Proof: Let p be an arbitrary point in S. Note that the set S is an bounded d-dimensional convex subset of R |X | , where d ≤ (|X | − 1). Therefore, any point in S can be written as a convex combination of at most |X | extreme points of S. Hence, p can be written as p =
are the extreme points of S with p i = p j (i = j ). Due to the concavity of the entropy, one has that
Therefore, from (13), it is sufficient to consider only the extreme points of S in the minimization. Using Lemma 2, the optimization in (12) can be solved in two steps: a first step in which the extreme points of set S are identified, followed by a second step where proper weights over these extreme points are obtained to minimize the objective function.
For the first step, we first note that the extreme points of S are the corresponding basic feasible solutions (c.f. [27] , [28] ) of the polytope in standard form 
end if 13: end for 14: return p 1 , . . . , p K 15: end function computing (12) is equivalent to solving
where u is a K -dimensional weight vector, and it can be verified that 1 T K · u = 1 holds if the constraint in (14) is met. The problem in (14) is a standard LP.
Corollary 1.1: In the evaluation of (2), it is necessary to have |Y| ≥ |X | rank(P)
. Proof: From the procedure of finding the extreme points of S, it is observed that these points have at most rank(P) nonzero elements. Therefore, in order to write the |X |-dimensional probability vector p X n as a convex combination of the extreme points of S, at least |X | rank(P) points are needed, which results in |Y| ≥ |X | rank(P) .
Corollary 1.2: For a given dataset X n , we can write
≤ log min
In (15), we have used the fact that i) it is sufficient to consider those p X n |y that belong to the set of extreme points of S, ii) these extreme points have at most rank(P) nonzero elements, and iii) entropy is maximized by the uniform distribution. The upper bound in (16) follows from the fact that the rows of P are linearly dependent, since we have
, which means that there are at most n i=1 |X i | − (n − 1) linearly independent rows in P. Following the proof of Theorem 1, Algorithm III-A provides a summary of how to compute the optimal disclosure mapping, using as inputs p W,X n . Although effective, the performance of Algorithm III-A scales poorly with the dataset size n. Suboptimal procedures to build perfectly-private mappings are discussed in Section V-C.
Algorithm 2 Building the optimal disclosure mapping p
end for 6: Find u * = Argmin 
end if 14: end for 15 :
16:
17: 
where α, β ∈ (0, 1) with β ≥ α are degrees of freedom that determine the marginals, i.e., X 1 ∼ Bern(α) and X 2 ∼ Bern(β), while r ∈ [0, R] with R min{α, 1 − β} determines the interdependency between X 1 and X 2 . If r ∈ (0, R) 3 , we haveX = {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}, and correspondingly one finds that
A direct calculation shows that Null(P) is spanned by the single vector n = 1 −1 −1 1 T . As the null space of P is one-dimensional, one can check that S has only two extreme points given by a 1 = p X 2 − (R − r )n and a 2 = p X 2 + r n. The original distribution can be recovered as a convex combination of these two extreme points, i.e.,
3 For the uninteresting cases where r ∈ {0, R}, we have |X | < 4 and nul(P) = 0. Consequently, Proposition 1 gives I s = 0.
Therefore, using (12), I s can be computed as
Using (19) , it is direct to verify that I s > 0 if and only if n ∈ Null(P W |X 2 ). Finally, the optimal mapping P * Y |X 2 is derived as follows. Considering (18) 
It is important to note that, although the disclosure capacity in (19) depends on the choice of P W |X 2 , the optimal synergistic disclosure strategy in (20) is only a functional of p X 2 (or equivalently, α, β, r ), and does not depend on P W |X 2 . This observation is a special case of the following proposition. In this setting nul(P) = 1, and as a result, S has only two extreme points 4 . Therefore, the mere condition of preserving p X n suffices to define the probability masses of these two extreme points. Hence, the LP is solved by its constraint, not being affected by the choice of W .
Proposition 4: For the tuple (W, X n ), in which
Proposition 4 implies that the same mapping is optimal in addressing any possible query over the data, as determined by p W |X n . Unfortunately, this does not hold in general.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC PERFORMANCE ON LARGE DATASETS
In this section we analyze datasets that are composed by noisy measurements X 1 , . . . , X n of a variable of interest W , and focus on their asymptotic properties. For the sake of tractability, we focus on the case where the noise that affects each measurement is conditionally i.i.d. given W . In the sequel, Section IV-A introduces tools that are later used in our analysis, which is outlined in Section IV-B.
A. Preliminaries
For a pair of random variables (X, W ) ∈ X ×W, with finite alphabets, following [29] , we define 5 Since H (U |W ) = 0 implies that U is a deterministic function of W , (21) means that among all the functions of W that make X and W conditionally independent, we want to find the one with the lowest entropy. It can be verified that
where the first inequality is due to the data processing inequality applied on the Markov chain X − U − W , i.e., I (U ; W ) ≥ I (X; W ), and the second inequality is a direct result of the fact that U = W satisfies the constraints in (21). Let T X : W → P(X ) be a mapping from W to the probability simplex on X defined by w → p X |W (·|w). It is shown in [29, Theorem 3] that the minimizer in (21) is U * = T X (W ); furthermore, it is proved in [29, Lemma 5] that C X (W ) = H (W ) if and only if there do not exist w 1 , w 2 ∈ W such that p X |W (·|w 1 ) = p X |W (·|w 2 ). In the sequel, for a given pmf p W,X , we denote U * byW , and hence, we have H (W ) = C X (W ). Moreover, W −W − X andW − W − X are Markov chains. Fig. 1 provides an example ofW for a given p W,X .
To conclude this subsection, we present the notion of typical sequences. Assume that u n is an n-sequence whose elements are drawn from an arbitrary set denoted by U. The type of u n is defined as
Then, for a fixed pmf q U (·) on U, and ∈ (0, 1), define the -typical set as 6
B. Asymptotic Analysis
Let W be a variable of interest that is distributed according to p W (|W| < ∞), and consider a dataset X n where X i 's are i.i.d. conditioned on W according to p X |W (|X | < ∞). In other words, p X n |W (x n |w) = n i=1 p X |W (x i |w), ∀x n ∈ X n , ∀w ∈ W, ∀n ≥ 1. This model corresponds to dataset of noisy observations (X i 's) of an underlying phenomenon (W ), where the observational noise is i.i.d. In the sequel, we use X 6 Here we use the notation T n (q U (·)) over T n (U ) as in [30] , to emphasize the generating distribution. This is useful in the sequel when considering conditional pmfs as the underlying generator.
(without subscript or superscript) to denote a generic r.v. that follows p X |W .
Prior to investigating the privacy-preserving data disclosure, we characterize the total information contained in the observations about the underlying phenomenon that can be disclosed when there are no privacy constraints.
Theorem 2: We have
where C X (W ) is defined in (21) . Proof: From the definition ofW , it can be verified that W −W − X n , andW − W − X n , where X i 's are also i.i.d. conditioned onW . For the converse, we have
The achievability is as follows. We have p X |W (·|i ) = p X |W (·| j ), ∀i, j ∈W (i = j ), which follows from the definition ofW . As a result, for a fixed i, j
Hence, we have i, j > 0. Also, let min i, j ∈W i = j i, j , which is positive, since it is the minimum over a finite set of positive elements. It can be verified that from this choice of , the -typical sets corresponding to the pmfs p X |W (·|i ) (∀i ∈W)
e = Pr{W = L n } denote the error probability in the Markov chain W − X n − L n . We can write
where the last step follows from the law of large numbers (LLN), since conditioned on {W = i }, X i 's are i.i.d. according to p X |W (·|i ). Therefore, from the data processing and Fano's inequalities
e log |W|, (27) and hence lim n→∞ I (W ; X n ) ≥ H (W ) = C X (W ). (28) instead of (23) in the proof of achievability,
Remark 5: The proof of achievability relies on the notion of robust typicality [30], which is used to distinguish between different conditional pmfs of the form p X |W (·|i ). It is important to note that the notion of weak typicality does not suffice for this purpose. In other words, assume that the -typical set for a given pmf q U (·) is defined as
The key difference is that while using (23) 
enables us to distinguish between different conditional pmfs of the form p X |W (·|i ), using (28) aims at doing the same task only through their corresponding conditional entropies, i.e., H (X|W = i ).
Remark 6: Equation (23) can be used instead of (21) as the definition of C X (W ). In other words, for a pair (W, X) ∼ p W,X one can define
In what follows, the asymptotic behaviour of the synergistic disclosure capacity I s (W ; X n ) is investigated as the number of data samples grows. To this end, we make use of the following definition.
Definition 3: For a given pmf p W,X ,
where
The above definitions capture the utility-privacy trade-off in a hypothetical scenario, in which the curator discloses information aboutW while preserving the privacy of X. To this end, in the case of C 1 (·), the curator has access only toW , which is similar to the output perturbation model in [7] . In the case of C 2 (·), the curator has the extra advantage of observing X, which is similar to the full data observation model in [7] . 
where C 1 (·) is defined in (29) . Proof: At first, it is not clear that I s (W, X n ) converges with n; on the one hand, having more data samples helps conveying some information about W , while on the other hand, it adds to the constraints of perfect sample privacy. In fact, I s can have a non-monotonous dependency on n, as shown in the example provided in Table I . In spite of this, one can see that as n grows, a better estimate ofW becomes available at the input of the privacy mapping, i.e, L n as defined in (25) . Hence, as n increases, one can expect that I s gets closer to
which is formally stated in the following Lemma 7 . Lemma 3: We have
The proof can be found in the extended online version [26] . At this stage, the convergence of I s can be proved as follows. It can be verified that J is a non-increasing function of n, since by increasing n, the number of privacy constraints increases, while in contrast to the case of I s , it does not improve the knowledge of the curator aboutW , which is already available at the input of the privacy mapping. Hence, being a bounded function, it converges. This settles the convergence of I s to lim n→∞ J .
In order to obtain the limit, we proceed as follows. Consider the Markov chain
The following Lemma states that requiring perfect sample privacy over a large available dataset guarantees almost perfect sample privacy for those data samples that are not available at the input of the privacy mapping.
Lemma 4: In the Markov chain X
The proof is omitted due to space constraints; please refer to the extended online version [26] for the proof.
The last stage needed in the proof is provided in the following Lemma.
Lemma 5: C 1 (α) is continuous in α.
Proof: Please find the proof in the extended online version [26] .
From Lemma 4, we can write I (X; Y ) = θ n , in which, lim n→∞ θ n = 0. Therefore, from the definition of C 1 (·), we have
It is also evident that J (W, X n ) ≥ C 1 (0), since the maximizer in C 1 (0) can be regarded as a suboptimal mapping in J .
Therefore, we can write
Finally, from Lemma 5 and 3, we have
This completes the proof.
Remark 7:
The quantity J (W, X n ), defined in (32) , serves as a bridge between the full data observation and output perturbation models. In other words,
We have
For the last two inequalities, we proceed as follows. In X −W − Y with X ⊥ ⊥ Y , we have
where (38) 
follows from having I (W ; X) = I (W ; X), and H (W ) ≤ H (W ).
For the first inequality, we note that as in the proof of Lemma 1, having Y ⊥ ⊥ X in the Markov chain X −W − Y is equivalent to having pW |y ∈ Null(P X |W ), ∀y ∈ Y. As a result, the evaluation of C 1 (0) reduces to the minimization of H (W |Y ) over {pW |y ∈ Null(P X |W )} such that the marginal pmf ofW is preserved. Similar to the proof of Corollary 1.2, we have the upper bound of log rank(P X |W ) on the minimum value of H (W |Y ), such that X ⊥ ⊥ Y , which in turn is upper bounded by log |X |. By noting that H (W ) = C X (W ), the proof of the first inequality is complete. Proof: It can be readily verified that in this case, we havẽ W = V , and hence, H (W |X) = 0. From Proposition 5, and Remark 7, we have
V. SYNERGISTIC SELF-DISCLOSURE
In some cases there is no clear latent variable of interest, and the goal of the dataset owner is just to disclose as much of the dataset as possible while keeping the privacy constrains. This section studies this scenario for the case of large datasets.
A. Definitions and Fundamental Properties Definition 4:
The synergistic self-disclosure capacity is defined asÎ
Similarly, the synergistic self-disclosure efficiency is defined
One interesting property ofÎ s (X n ) is thatÎ s (X n ) ≥ I s (W, X n ) for any latent feature W , being this a direct consequence of the data processing inequality applied to W −X n −Y . We now provide a simple upper bound for the synergistic selfdisclosure efficiency.
Lemma 6: The following upper bound holds:
Proof: This follows directly from Proposition 2, by setting W = X n .
The previous lemma shows thatη(X n ) < 1 for any finite dataset, i.e., finite n. Hence, one might wonder if there are cases in whichη → 1 as n grows. Our next result shows that, remarkably, this happens whenever the entropy rate of the process, denoted by H (X ), exists and is non-zero.
Theorem 4: Consider a stochastic process {X i } i≥1 , with
If the entropy rate of this process exists, then
where H (X ) denotes the entropy rate of the stochastic process
which results in
Taking the limit n → ∞ proves (40). Hence, when H (X ) = 0, we can write
Theorem 4 signifies the fact that the constraints of perfect sample privacy, i.e., Y ⊥ ⊥ X i , ∀i ∈ [n], result in no asymptotic loss of the disclosure. This implies, in turn, that when the statistics of a large dataset are known then its contents can be privately disclosed efficiently.
Corollary 4.1: Assume that instead of the perfect sample privacy constraint, i.e., Y ⊥ ⊥
X i , ∀i ∈ [n], a more restrictive constraint is used, such as Y ⊥ ⊥ (X i , X i+1 ), ∀i ∈ [n − 1], and in general, Y ⊥ ⊥ (X i , . . . , X i+k−1 ), ∀i ∈ [n − k + 1] for a fixed (i.e.,
not scaling with n) positive integer k. The results of Theorem 4 still hold under these conditions.
Proof:
, the number of rows of matrix P is at most M k (n − k + 1), which is an upper bound on its rank. Since in the evaluation of self-disclosure capacity, the extreme points of S have at most M k (n − k + 1) non-zero elements, and log(M k (n−k+1)) n → 0 as n → ∞, the proof of Theorem 4 remains unaltered.
The next example illustrates how the efficiency of synergistic disclosure can converge to 1 as n grows even with a more stringent privacy constraint compared to perfect sample privacy.
Example 2 
where (45) 
B. Self-Disclosure of Continuous Variables
Here we study the self-disclosure properties of small datasets composed of two continuous variables X 1 , X 2 .
Theorem 5: Let X 1 , X 2 be two independent and continuous random variables with X 1 , X 2 ⊂ R. We have
Proof: Let K be an arbitrary positive integer. Partition
) with equal probabilities. LetŶ be a deterministic function of (X 1 , X 2 ) defined aŝ
It is easy to verify thatŶ is uniformly distributed over [K ] . Also, the distribution ofŶ is the same after observing any realization of X 1 (or X 2 ); hence, we haveŶ
where we have used the fact that H (Ŷ |X 1 , X 2 ) = 0, sincê Y is a deterministic function of (X 1 , X 2 ). Letting K → ∞ completes the proof.
C. Heuristic Approaches
In the method proposed in Section III, the complexity of the computations required for building the optimal synergistic mapping grows exponentially with the size of the dataset. The main bottleneck of Algorithm III-A is the exhaustive search over groups of columns of A that is needed to find all the extreme points of S.
It is worth to note that the search of extreme points of S can become computationally expensive due to two reasons: either the dataset has a large number of samples, or their alphabet is big. In the sequel, Section V-C.1 presents a procedure that addresses the first issue, while Section V-C.2 takes care of the second. Please note that, although both procedures are presented for scenarios where the datasets are composed of independent samples, it is straightforward to generalize them to datasets composed of groups of samples that are independent of other groups, and can be jointly processed.
1) Partial Processing Method:
Let us assume that X n is composed by independent samples. Let us generate mappings of the form p Y par, j |X j ,X j +1 for j ∈ [n − 1] according to 
Proof: See Appendix C. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 . The asymptotic efficiency is maximal only for the case of Pr{X
The performance of this disclosure mapping for the case of i.i.d. Bernoulli samples is illustrated in
This approach can be further generalized as follows: for a given k
Note that (52) correspond to the case of k = 2. Interestingly, schemes with large values of k attain high disclosure efficiency, at the cost of incurring more expensive computations for calculating the corresponding mappings. Therefore, k can be tuned in order to balance efficiency and computational complexity. In order to illustrate the dependency between computational complexity and k, consider a simple scenario where all the samples have the same alphabet size, i.e. |X 1 | = · · · = |X n | := C, and all the entries of p X n are strictly positive. As noted above, the computational complexity is dominated by the exhaustive search over groups of columns of A; in this case, as P is a nC × C n matrix, the complexity of this tasks grows as O( C n nC ). In contrast, the proposed partial-processing method needs to do the same task n − k + 1 times over grous of k variables, and hence the complexity of the task grows as (n −k +1)
2) Pre-Processing of Independent Datasets: Another approach for building sub-optimal disclosure mappings is to perform a pre-processing stage over the dataset, in order to make it reach a distribution for which the optimal disclosure strategy is already known. Furthermore, this pre-processing must be carried out in a way that does not violate the privacy constraints.
Assume that X n is a dataset of independent variables with the same alphabet, i.e.,
; however, if the marginal distributions, i.e., those of X i 's, are not uniform, then the aforementioned disclosure mapping does not satisfy perfect sample privacy anymore, and the optimal solution is obtained via the procedure explained in Section III. One sub-optimal solution is to first pass each X i through a "uniformizer", i.e., a pre-processing mapping, denoted by p S i |X i , such that S i is uniform over X . Then, the optimal synergistic disclosure mapping for i.i.d. uniformly distributed data samples can be applied to the new dataset S n . In this context, we denote the output by Y pre . Finally, the fact that 
The performance of this strategy is obtained as follows.
where h b ( p) − p log p−(1− p) log(1− p) denotes the binary entropy function, and the last step follows from the fact that
Finally, the disclosure efficiency of this method,η pre (X n ), grows monotonically with n, with the asymptotic disclosure Fig. 4 . Two-step process to generate a suboptimal disclosure mapping. Each sample is first pre-processed via a Z-channel with β = (1/2 − q)/ (1 − q) ; then, an optimal processing is performed over S n .
efficiency being as
The performance of this algorithm is shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 for the case of n = 4. When processing samples with small alphabets this approach is often less efficient than the one described in Section V-C.1. However, the main strength of this approach is that it can be applied to datasets composed by samples with large alphabets, e.g. using the mapping outlined in Example 2. Note that, because optimal strategies for uniform independent samples are easy to build, this task entirely avoids the bottleneck of our main algorithm noted above. Therefore, it computational complexity grows linearly with the number of samples, being related to the cost the pre-processing stage.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We developed synergistic data disclosure methods, which allow to make collective properties of a dataset publicly available while keeping the values of each data sample perfectly confidential. We showed that both privacy and utility can be attained by exploiting counter-intuitive properties of multivariate statistics, which allow a variable to be correlated with a random vector while being independent to each of it components. We presented an algorithm that builds an optimal synergistic disclosure mapping following standard LP techniques. Moreover, we developed closed-form expressions for the synergistic disclosure capacity in a number of scenarios.
Although perfect sample privacy could seem to be a restrictive ideal, our results show that in many scenarios there exist disclosure mappings whose efficiency tends asymptotically to one. This means that the amount of data that one needs to hide in order to guarantee perfect sample privacy becomes negligible for large datasets. This promising result --which holds with remarkable generality --shows that our approach can be efficient while providing strong privacy guarantees.
When compared with differential privacy, both approaches share the property of being robust to post-processing (as any function of a perfect sample-private mapping keeps this property). An advantage of our approach is that, while differential privacy is known to be less efficient in cases of correlated data [31] (although partial solutions to this issue have been proposed [31] [32] [33] [34] ), our approach is well-suited to data with any underlying distribution. However, a limitation of our approach is that it requires knowledge of the statistics of the dataset and latent feature, which are unknown in many real scenarios. One approach to estimate unknown statistics would be to employ Bayesian inference [35] or machine learning techniques [36] . However, an important future research direction to make this practical would be to analyze the impact of estimation errors on the privacy guarantees. Another possible approach may be to use adversarial neural networks utilizing empirical loss functions to directly estimate the privacy and utility measures from data samples, following the approach reported in recent work [37] , [38] . APPENDIX A Let Y be an arbitrary set. Let S be the set of probability vectors defined in (9) . Let Q denote an index set of rank(P) linearly independent columns of P. Hence, the columns corresponding to the index set Q c = [|X |]\Q can be written as a linear combination of the columns indexed by Q. Let π : [nul(P)] → Q c such that π(i ) < π( j ) for i < j, ∀i, j ∈ [nul(P)]. Let r : S → R nul(P)+1 be a vector-valued mapping defined element-wise as
where p(π(i )) denotes the π(i )-th element of the probability vector p. Since S is a closed and bounded subset of P(X ), it is compact. Also, r is a continuous mapping from S to R nul(P)+1 . Therefore, from the support lemma [30] , for every Y ∼ F(y) defined on Y, there exists a random variable Y ∼ p(y ) with |Y | ≤ nul(P) + 1 and a collection of conditional probability vectors p X |y ∈ S indexed by y ∈ Y , such that It can be verified that by knowing the marginals p X i , ∀i ∈ [n], and the nul(P) elements of p X n corresponding to index set Q c , the remaining |X | − nul(P) elements of p X n can be uniquely 
APPENDIX B
The proof of continuity of C 1 (·) is divided into two parts: the case of α > 0, and α = 0. Note that only the latter is used in this paper, but the general claim is proved in this appendix.
The first part follows from the concavity of C 1 (·). Assume p 1 Y |W is the maximizer in C 1 (α 1 ), and p 2 Y |W is that in C 1 (α 2 ). Note that the mutual information terms involved in C 1 (·) do not depend on the actual realizations of the random variables, but their mass probabilities. Hence, we can assume that 
